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defaults tend to plague middle income and highly indebted poor countries (HIPCs). 8 However, debt crises in the eurozone show that this vulnerability extends beyond emerging markets. 9 Recent events in the United States even illustrated the potential for politically manufactured sovereign defaults. 10 Increasingly in question is the common assumption that advanced economies are completely different than emerging markets in terms of available policy solutions in managing unsustainable debt burdens.
11
Sometimes likened to a Greek tragedy, Argentina's troubled history with sovereign debt goes back centuries. 12 The latest chapter began in late 2001 when Argentina suspended payments on roughly $100 billion in sovereign bonds-the largest sovereign debt default in world history. 13 After contentious restructuring negotiations, Argentina eventually exchanged most of its defaulted bonds for new debt, but not before a significant number of bonds were acquired by distressed-debt hedge funds, often referred to as "vulture" funds, which specialize in acquiring cheap, distressed debt and subsequently litigating for a profit.
14 In 2012, a lawsuit led by vulture hedge funds resulted in the Southern District of New York's groundbreaking decision in NML Capital, Ltd. v 12 See Bob Van Voris, Argentina 'Greek Tragedy' Nears End as Debt Ruling Looms, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 1, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-03-31/argentina-greek-tragedy-nears-end-as-debt -ruling-looms. 13 See J.F. HORNBECK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41029, ARGENTINA , CONG. RESEARCH SERV.13-03-31 5 (2013).
14 See id. ("A diverse group of 'holdouts' representing $18.6 billion did not tender their bonds and some have opted to litigate instead."). For the sake of brevity, distressed debt hedge funds are at times referred to as "vulture" funds in this Article. 15 See Sovereign Debt: Hold-outs Upheld, ECONOMIST, Nov. 3, 2012, at 74-75, available at http://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21565635-court-ruling-against-argentina-has-21 NML's radical solution to unenforceability problems could complicate sovereign debt restructuring. 22 Also, New York is a critical jurisdiction, not just for sovereign debt but also for corporate debt issuances. 23 Thus, for good reason, the Financial Times suggests that NML is the "the trial of the century" in sovereign debt litigation. 24 Scholars and practitioners alike have analyzed the recent evolution of sovereign debt law, which has undergone important changes in the last few implications-other-governments-hold-outs. 16 Though the Latin phrase pari passu literally means "in equal step," its legal meaning in sovereign debt contracts is the subject of considerable debate. Most pari passu clauses provide that a debtor will maintain equal footing among obligations. See infra notes 201-11 and accompanying text. 17 . 23 See Das et al., supra note 7, at 41 (illustrating that New York law governs $272 billion out of a total of $411 billion in emerging market sovereign bonds, representing 435 issuances out of a total of 631 issuances). 24 Joseph Cotterill, Pari Passu Saga, FIN. TIMES ALPHAVILLE BLOG, http://ftalphaville.ft.com/tag/ pari-passu-saga/ (last visited Jan. 31, 2014). 35:49 (2014) 54 decades. 25 For example, quantitative studies have measured the rise in sovereign debt litigation. 26 A wide range of economic issues in sovereign debt have been explored over the last several decades. 27 Existing literature has documented the history and debate on the meaning of pari passu-the covenant at the heart of the most recent and disruptive wave of sovereign debt litigation. 28 This Article builds on existing literature by analyzing NML within the context of "rogue" trends in sovereign debt and developing practical arguments to support a narrow application of NML.
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"Bad facts make bad law," goes the old common law axiom. NML brings that cliché to life. Faced with bad facts, the NML court made bad law to punish an uncooperative sovereign defendant. In doing so, the court resorted to drastic measures, relying on enforcement against innocent third parties through injunctive remedies. As a result, NML creates major uncertainties for sovereign debt markets. Unfortunately, NML is unlikely to remain an isolated occurrence. Faced with unenforceability and essentially rendered powerless to compel payment by unwilling sovereign defendants, other courts have succumbed-as future courts likely will-to the temptation of injunctive remedies.
There are compelling grounds for a narrow approach regarding NML's precedential value. Not only is NML an unsuitable point of departure with exceptional factual circumstances, the Second Circuit opinion explicitly provides textual grounds for distinguishing NML from future cases. NML is a true factual outlier. Although the Second Circuit partially recognized Argentina as a "uniquely recalcitrant" debtor, NML represents the most exceptional sovereign debt situation in modern history. This Article is organized as follows: Part II provides background on the law of sovereign debt, restructuring practices, and the current environment for sovereign debt litigation. Part III sets forth the exceptional nature of Argentina's situation across the various stages of sovereign debt. Part IV analyzes Argentina's pari passu clause and the NML decision. Building on language from the Second Circuit's opinion, Part V justifies a narrow reading and limited application of NML to future sovereign debt cases.
II. THE EVOLVING LAW OF SOVEREIGN DEBT
For good reason, sovereign debt is often characterized as unenforceable. 31 Courts generally lack effective enforcement and collection mechanisms required to hold accountable unwilling sovereigns.
32
In nonsovereign, "normal" situations, the remedy for a failure to repay debt is typically a money judgment enforceable with asset seizures. In sovereign debt, assets are often beyond the reach of creditors because collection is complicated if not impossible.
33
Sovereigns usually have few, if any, commercial assets outside of their own borders for creditors to attach. 34 Moreover, military options available in extraordinary situations during the era of "gunboat diplomacy" are no longer available to powerful creditor nations. 
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This Part provides background information on the law of sovereign debt, restructuring practices, and the current environment for sovereign debt litigation. First, this Part briefly explains increasing pressures on the unenforceability of sovereign debt contracts. Second, this Part assesses the current environment of sovereign debt litigation and the role of distressed debt hedge funds in recent legal developments. Third, this Part addresses the legal nature of sovereign debt restructuring in the absence of sovereign insolvency mechanisms.
A. Unenforceability Under Fire
Following the Latin American debt crises in the 1980s, sovereign debt markets underwent an important shift under the Brady Plan from syndicated lending to bond financing. 36 During the syndicated lending era, sovereigns typically borrowed from commercial banks under a single loan agreement.
37
Under the Brady Plan, existing loan obligations were securitized and converted into bonds. As a result, sovereign creditors became far more numerous and atomized.
A secondary market for sovereign debt instruments thus emerged. However, atomization also created new complexities and exacerbated collective action problems, all of which further complicated orderly debt restructuring. 38 While commercial banks proved willing participants in voluntary debt restructuring efforts, atomized bondholders with divergent interests have proven more difficult. Recent years have seen increasing creditor litigation against sovereigns while the identity of plaintiffs has shifted from large banks to distressed debt hedge funds, which account for 90% of such lawsuits since 2000. 39 Also on the rise is the percentage of sovereign defaults that trigger lawsuits, which has doubled in recent years. 40 Unenforceability has shown some signs of erosion beginning in the 1970s. First, the scope of sovereign immunity was trimmed with the U.S. 40 Id. at 2 ("The likelihood that a debt crisis is accompanied by creditor litigation has more than doubled over the past decade, to more than 40% in recent years."). For details on the complexity of the Argentine default, see infra note 122 and accompanying text. 41 The FSIA codified several exceptions to sovereign immunity, including commercial activities. In doing so, the Belgian court embraced a ratable payment interpretation of pari passu advocated in a declaration by Professor Andreas Lowenfeld. 54 This approach to pari passu requires a sovereign to pay holdouts and exchange bondholders alike. Relying on the ratable interpretation, the court crafted injunctions prohibiting financial institutions from processing payments from Peru to exchange bondholders. In doing so, the Belgian court denied Peru's ability to prioritize payments among creditors-an established privilege of sovereign borrowers for the better part of a century. 55 In effect, this approach forced Peru to decide between defaulting on the exchanged bonds and paying the holdouts. Facing these scenarios, Peru opted to settle with Elliott Associates for $58.4 million, a 400% gain on the purchase value of the defaulted bonds for the hedge fund. 56 Importantly, the ratable approach in pari passu litigation allows holdouts to interfere with a sovereign's cross-border payments to other creditors-namely exchange bondholders who participated in debt restructuring-rather than engaging in the difficult game of attaching the sovereign's assets. Finding a court willing to adopt this radical approach may be challenging, but the ratable interpretation of pari passu combined with injunctive relief alleviates the classic attachment problem for collecting against sovereigns. But this approach also has high collateral costs, often at the expense of innocent third parties like exchange creditors and financial institutions. 57 Importantly, this approach weakens creditor 52 For detailed chronology and critiques of the pari passu trend in sovereign debt litigation, see Most of the legal innovation in sovereign debt litigation stems from cases brought by distressed debt hedge funds, also known as "vulture" funds. 59 These funds specialize in acquiring distressed sovereign debt at deep discounts before attempting to recover a profit through more favorable swaps or litigation. 60 Like the role of the vulture in a real ecosystem, vulture funds play a somewhat underappreciated role in financial markets, providing scarce liquidity to bondholders seeking an exit in distressed times. 61 Fairness and ethics aside, vulturing is also a legal activity. In fact, the business of vulturing is fundamentally legal in nature-dependent almost entirely on the judicial enforcement of contractual rights. 62 But these hedge funds have their share of critics, ranging from United Nations officials and IMF economists to religious charities. 63 Many dismiss 60 the industry as an unethical practice that further burdens the poor and undermines debt relief for HIPCs. 64 Indeed, vulture funds are particularly likely to be plaintiffs in legal actions against HIPCs. 65 On average, targets of vulture litigation tend to be middle income and poor countries that have recently undergone serious economic distress. 66 Critics also maintain that vulture funds benefit a small number of elites at the expense of taxpayers in developing countries.
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Adding to popular intrigue, the vulture industry is also famously opaque and often staged from offshore tax havens through various limited liability investment vehicles. 68 These tendencies reinforce the perception that these funds prey on taxpayers in developing countries to benefit wealthy tycoons. Two of the most famous and successful vulture funds include Dart Management (founded by Kenneth Dart) and Elliott Management (founded by Paul Elliott Singer).
69
Dart and Singer are prominent faces in the distressed debt industry; both are plaintiffs in NML through affiliated entities.
70
Returns in the distressed debt business can be extremely lucrative.
71
But the business model does not suit just anyone; it requires an appetite for risk and ample cash for expensive legal battles against sovereigns.
72
Though funds may buy sovereign debt for a fraction of face value, the deep discounts usually reflect the likelihood of creditor losses and the significant costs and risks associated with collection. Indeed, full repayment is not the 64 See Lynn, infra note 66. 65 See Schumacher et al., supra note 8, at 3 ("'Vulture' funds are also particularly likely to initiate legal disputes against Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC). Of the 20 cases filed against HIPC, 13 were filed by 'vultures.'"). 66 73 Although most attachment efforts prove fruitless, they often make headlines-as with the attempted seizures of Argentine assets around the world. 74 In October 2012, Elliott Associates persuaded Ghanaian authorities to seize the Libertad, a classic three-masted sailing frigate used for naval training and goodwill missions. 75 After some dramatic moments and a drawn-out legal battle, the U.N. Tribunal for the Law of the Sea ordered that the Libertad be released. 76 Meanwhile, Argentina's presidential plane, the Tango 01, remained conspicuously grounded following the debacle in Ghana. 77 Other asset skirmishes involved efforts to attach $105 million in reserves held by the Central Bank of Argentina.
78
On another occasion, the office of a representative of the province of Buenos Aires in New York was targeted. Even dinosaur fossils on exhibition in Europe were targets for attachment. 79 Though none of these attempts successfully yielded valuable assets, they were all costly and embarrassing for Argentina. The financial impact of asset battles can easily run into the millions. 80 More difficult to quantify but also painful, these skirmishes also involve reputational damage and interference with international commerce and other cross-border 73 See Gelpern, Contract Hope, supra note 31; see also Bratton, supra note 45, at 824 ("Sovereigns in default rarely leave valuables lying around subject to attachment in creditor-friendly jurisdictions."). 74 Yet, no such system exists. In the absence of a formal insolvency regime, sovereign debt defaults typically lead to voluntary negotiated restructurings and reissuances of new debt. 84 Existing debt obligations are exchanged for new debt obligations through negotiated restructuring. Though imperfect, restructuring practices have balanced the interests of creditors and sovereign debtors for generations. 85 In most cases, the vast majority of creditors participate in the debt exchanges because the burden of a financial crisis is shared between the debtor and its creditors.
86
"Holdout" creditors are those who decide not to participate in a debt exchange whereas "exchange" creditors do. Institutional lenders, such as large banks, prefer participation and collaborative restructuring to holding out. Though hedge funds are usually the most visible and significant holdouts, sometimes retail investors or pensioners holdout as well.
In exchange for granting debt relief to allow a distressed sovereign the chance to restore fiscal stability, creditors agree to take a loss-the socalled "haircut"-and receive newly issued debt.
87 Surprisingly, given the But without an insolvency regime, sovereigns do not enjoy benefits of debtorfriendly provisions found, for example, in U.S. bankruptcy law. Detroit, for instance, has relied upon the threat of "cram downs" and bankruptcy protections to convince creditors and pensioners to take haircuts. 89 Theoretical models predict that when haircuts are deemed excessive relative to the sovereign's ability to pay, an exchange offer is more likely to fail. 90 Likewise, deep haircuts are more likely to spawn litigation. 91 Although sovereign creditors lack leverage enjoyed by creditors in other areas of the law, sovereign borrowers and their creditors have resolved disputes through restructuring for generations. 92 Despite limited enforcement mechanisms, sovereigns have compelling reasons to pay debts. Traditionally, sovereign motivation was explained by diplomacy, access to markets, sanctions, and reputational factors. 93 More recent accounts have addressed domestic costs of default as an explanation for sovereign motivation, including the political consequences of debt default. 94 
III. NML: SOVEREIGN DEBT OUTLIER
The Second Circuit recognized Argentina's situation as an "exceptional" on unlikely to be seen again in the future. 95 The Second Circuit arrived at this conclusion in light of Argentina's track record as a "recalcitrant" debtor with "a long history of defaulting on its debts," while describing Argentina's behavior as "extraordinary."
96 Although the Second This part illustrates that NML's facts make it an outlier by wide margins. First, this part explains Argentina's exceptional sovereign debt history. Second, Argentina's default was the largest and most complex in world history. 98 Third, the circumstances leading up to the 2001 crisis were also exceptional, casting doubt about the legitimacy of Argentina's foreign debt-particularly within Argentina's political system-from the outset of the default. 99 Fourth, Argentina's "uniquely unilateral and coercive" approach to restructuring was unparalleled, setting the stage for a similarly unprecedented flood of sovereign debt litigation.
100
Finally, during the litigation stage, the Argentine situation has again defied historic trends in sovereign debt.
101
A. Argentina's Unique Sovereign Debt History
The Argentine government has been labeled-fairly or unfairly-as a "rogue debtor" and a "serial defaulter."
102
Putting it slightly more delicately, the Second Circuit opted for the label of "recalcitrant debtor." 103 As explained in this part, these labels are nothing new for Argentina. Almost a decade prior to the 2001 default, one writer observed, "Argentina emerged as the single most resistant debtor in international finance." 104 Studies have concluded that there may be a self-perpetuating aspect to serial defaults: the less reputational capital a debtor has to lose, the more attractive the default option might become. Argentina led Latin America-and the developing world, for that matter-in scholarship on sovereign debt from the perspective of former colonies. Historically, Argentine scholars and diplomats have been at the forefront of theory on the law of sovereign debt, especially concerning rights of newly independent sovereigns. 112 In 1863, Argentine jurist Carlos Calvo published the foundations of the highly influential Calvo Doctrine.
113
As Venezuela was facing a "gunboat diplomacy" style intervention by European powers in 1902, Luis M. Drago, Argentina's Minister of Foreign Affairs, wrote a letter that established the Drago Doctrine.
114
Both doctrines advocate for host government sovereign rights in investment disputes, which were especially important to newly independent nations emerging from colonialism. The collapse was comprehensive and tragically spectacular-one of the worst currency crises of the modern era. Argentina's crisis involved the deepest drop in gross domestic product (GDP) suffered during peaceful times by any capitalist country with a significant economy since at least World War II. 117 Real per capita GDP fell backwards by three decades. 118 The Argentine peso declined 75% versus the U.S. dollar in a matter of months. 119 Meanwhile, Argentina's public debt ballooned from 45.7% of GDP in 2000 to 166.3% in 2002. 120 Argentina formally defaulted on bonds worth $81.2 billion in December of 2001. 121 The dimensions of this default were staggering. As illustrated in Figure 1 below, Argentina's default remains by far the largest sovereign debt default in history, dwarfing prior defaults by Russia ($30 billion), Ecuador ($6 billion), and Uruguay ($5 billion). 122 The Argentine default was also the most complex ever seen. Over half a million creditors scattered around the world held 152 varieties of defaulted debt instruments, which were denominated in six currencies under the laws of eight different jurisdictions. As the economy crashed, so did the nation's government and banking systems. 124 Political upheaval ensued as looting, protests, and even rioting took hold of urban centers. 125 At one point, Argentina technically had five presidents in the course of two weeks. 126 For Argentines, who are rather accustomed to enduring crises, this was la peor de todas, the worst of all. 127 Social costs were tragic. Argentina, a country with a history of relative prosperity and an established middle class, saw over half of its population fall below the poverty line. 128 Post crisis, approximately 25% of Argentina lived in extreme poverty compared to just 4% in 1992.
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129 Unemployment exceeded 20%. 130 Malnutrition became a serious problem in a country renowned for fine beef and abundant grains. 131 Living standards dropped The history behind NML raises poignant legitimacy questions and helps explain the politics of Argentina's behavior towards creditors. Just years before the largest sovereign default in world history, Argentina had been the emerging market darling of the international financial community.
132
Under President Carlos Saúl Menem in the 1990s, Argentina adhered to the "Washington Consensus," removing trade barriers, deregulating the economy, welcoming foreign investment, and privatizing key industries. 133 During this time, Argentina was continuously engaged with the IMF through policy advice and five successive financing arrangements. 134 Argentina was widely considered a "star pupil" of the IMF. 135 In 1998, President Menem was invited to address the IMF at its annual meeting to discuss the "absolute economic miracle" Argentina had undergone during his administration. 136 On one hand, there is little doubt that Argentina was the victim of selfinflicted damage. The government overborrowed while failing to practice the fiscal discipline required by a strict currency regime and its own economic policies. 137 Ultimately, responsibility for the failed policies of the 1990s belongs to the Argentine government.
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140
After the crisis, the IMF published a self-critical evaluation of its role in Argentina's crisis. 141 An independent report by the Independent Evaluation Office of the IMF was even more critical of the IMF's role in Argentina's debt situation.
142
As noted by the Economist in 2005, "Argentina defaulted so heavily because it defaulted so late." 143 If anything, Argentina may have been too reluctant to default on its obligations, racking up billions more in debt when default was already an inevitable conclusion. 144 Two loans extended in 2001, for instance, only exacerbated the existing debt burden. 145 The causal inquiry into Argentina's crash is a well-documented and vigorously debated topic. 146 Analyzing the economic meltdown is beyond the scope of this Article, but the backlash within Argentina against the IMF and the international financial community is particularly relevant here. Combined with rising poverty and high unemployment, this perception of great injustice-however accurate-brought the legitimacy of Argentina's international obligations and external debt into doubt from the outset of the crash. 147 As part of the exceptional nature of Argentina's sovereign debt situation, this reaction shaped the behavior of Argentina's leaders during the restructuring process and continues to influence policy towards holdout creditors. 148 Vulture funds are widely despised in Argentina; settling with Restructuring negotiations following Argentina's default were easily among the most adversarial restructuring negotiations ever. The Argentine restructuring defied established guidelines of sovereign debt negotiation and was widely considered "unique in its unilateral and coercive approach to the debt restructuring."
151 President Néstor Kirchner took a hard line, insisting that creditors take a sizeable haircut in line with Argentina's devastating losses. 152 The IMF, usually a key participant in sovereign debt restructuring negotiations, was much less involved due to controversy surrounding the Fund's role leading up to Argentina's economic crisis.
In January 2005, after years of bitter negotiations, Argentina opened a bond exchange (the 2005 Exchange) hoping to reach a final settlement on as many of the defaulted bonds as possible-roughly $104.1 billion in principal ($81.2 billion) and past due interest ($22.9 billion). 153 At that time, the $104.1 billion in defaulted bonds only represented about 53% of Argentina's total of $194.6 billion in unsustainable public debt. 154 As a consequence, bondholders shouldered a disproportionate burden in Argentina's attempt to achieve a sustainable level of debt through restructuring.
155
Like the crisis and the default, the 2005 Exchange was exceptional across the board: the amount in default ($104.1 billion), the lengthy duration of the restructuring process (over three years), the deep creditor haircut (roughly 76%), and the low participation rate (only 72% of bondholders). 156 In an average restructuring, negotiations last seven months and participation exceeds 95%. Representing par value of $62.3 billion, kirchner-president-carlos-menem-amnesty-laws. 149 At 72%, the participation rate of the 2005 Exchange fell far below the mean (Figure 2) . 158 Between 1997 and 2013, the average participation rate in sovereign debt exchanges was 95%.
159
All but two restructuringsArgentina and Dominica-had participation rates over 90%. 160 Through subsequent negotiations, Argentina achieved almost 93% participation and 157 A Victory By Default?, supra note 71. 158 See DUGGAR, supra note 100. 159 Id. 160 Id. According to one model, deeper haircuts decrease creditor participation and increase the likelihood of holdouts and litigation. 162 As illustrated in Figure 4 above, in a sample of 180 restructurings from 1970 to 2010, the haircut imposed on Argentina's creditors (roughly 77% in the 2005 Exchange) comes in far above average. 163 The average haircut during that period was 37% or just 30% in a volume weighted average. 164 Again, Argentina's sovereign debt situation is a quantitative outlier that defies modern restructuring trends. 165 Even the tone of the negotiations were exceptionally bitter, described as "unusually contentious" 166 and "unique[ly] . . . unilateral and coercive" 167 by prominent observers. However, the haircut story has a second chapter. Though the nominal haircut during the 2005 Exchange was unusually deep, Argentina's bond issuances in the 2005 and 2010 Exchanges included warranty payments linked to the country's future GDP growth. The GDP warrants provide that bondholders receive payments when Argentina's GDP growth exceeds predefined annual benchmarks. 168 In this way, the GDP-linked bonds resembled equity shares in Argentina's economy, which fared remarkably well in years following the 2005 Exchange in large part due to robust international demand for commodities like soy and grain as well as automobile exports to Brazil. 169 Holders of GDP-linked warrants saw dramatic gains in years following the debt restructurings. As a result, Argentina's haircut turned out to be fairly close to average for a sovereign restructuring: returns on the GDPlinked warrants reduced Argentina's haircut from roughly 77% to less than
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171
Payment caps on the GDP warrants limit the total amount that can be paid to 48 cents on the dollar, which still allows for further reduction in the true restructuring haircut. To date, Argentina has paid almost $10 billion under the GDP warrants.
172
Considering the scale and exceptional nature of Argentina's default, it may not be surprising that the duration of Argentina's restructuring negotiations was far longer than average as well. Forty months elapsed before the 2005 Exchange-more than double the eighteen-month average for a restructuring negotiation (Figure 3) . 173 Even more impressive, this comparison does not consider time elapsed between the 2001 default and the 2010 Exchange, which accounted for about 15% of the total bonds exchanged.
Also outside the norm were the extent and formality of Argentina's measures to prohibit payments to holdout bondholders. While prioritization of payments-or even nonpayments-is fairly common in sovereign debt, measures like Argentina's are rare. Leading up to the 2005 Exchange, Argentina insisted that holdouts would remain excluded from future payments on the defaulted bonds. Again, the 2010 Exchange prospectus reinforced previous statements warning that nonexchange bonds could remain in default indefinitely. 179 The 2010 Exchange closed in December of 2010 with roughly 67% participation among outstanding holders of defaulted bonds, bringing Argentina from 76% to 91.3% in overall exchange participation rate.
E. Argentina as a Sovereign Defendant
Argentina has been no less exceptional at the dispute phase. Between 1976 and 2010, one study identified 108 sovereign debt cases against 25 sovereign debtors.
181 Almost 88% of these cases were filed in the United States, mainly in the Southern District of New York, underscoring the importance of New York law for sovereign debt litigation. 182 With 41 out of 108 total cases, Argentina accounted for a weighty 37% of sovereign debt cases filed between 1976 and 2013. 183 As illustrated in Figure 5 below, the rest of the pack is far behind: Peru had 12, Iraq 4, and Nicaragua 4. Estimated volumes of litigation also illustrate the extraordinary nature of Argentina's sovereign debt situation. At $3.7 billion, Argentina's amount under litigation is approximately seventy-four times the average claim of $50 million, as illustrated in Table 6 . 185 After Argentina, the next largest amount litigated involved Brazil in the $1.4 billion CIBC v. Brazil lawsuit. 186 Even still, these samples only represent one component of Argentina's legal crisis: The Argentine government estimates as much as $15 billion in holdout claims remain in default, including the $1.3 billion at stake in NML. 187 In addition to the sovereign debt litigation, Argentina faced loan defaults 188 and an avalanche of investment arbitration claims in forums such as the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes. 189 Argentina has been a unique adversary to holdouts and plaintiffs. Sovereigns are rarely eager to cooperate with vulture plaintiffs, but perhaps no other government has taken such strong measures as Argentina to prevent payments from reaching holdouts adversaries. Argentina's Padlock Law and prospectus statements are unusual for their certainty, formality, and openly public nature.
191
Clashing with creditors has its costs. Argentina has suffered exceptionally harsh market penalties-yet another anomalous aspect of Argentina's situation. 192 Typically, markets have fairly short memories; sovereigns are usually readmitted to capital markets just two years after a default. 193 Argentina, however, remains essentially shunned from international capital markets to date. 194 This exclusion is largely associated with its so-called "pariah" status due to Argentina's ongoing disputes with investors and creditors. As a result, the Fernández Kirchner government has resorted to creative-but controversial and arguably unsustainablemethods to raise capital. 195 
IV. THE NML DECISION
NML stems from Argentina's 2001 default. While Argentina has made all payments due on the exchange bonds following the 2005 and 2010 Exchanges, no payments were made on holdout bonds. 196 Led by NML Capital, a diverse coalition of holdout plaintiffs sued Argentina in the Southern District of New York. The NML plaintiffs successfully argued that Argentina violated the pari passu clause by paying the exchange bondholders without paying holdout bondholders. 197 The court's holding was possible because it found Argentina's pari passu obligations required ratable payments to all bondholders. Further, the court remedied this
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198
Plaintiffs won again on appeal when a unanimous panel of the Second Circuit substantially affirmed the orders. 199 In February 2014, Argentina filed a petition for a writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court for review of the Second Circuit's interpretation of Argentina's pari passu obligations. Review was denied in June 2014. 200 This Part focuses on Argentina's pari passu clause and the significance of the NML decision in the broader context of a rogue trend towards ratable payment injunctions in pari passu litigation. First, this Part reviews the emergence of pari passu litigation and the competing interpretations of the pari passu clause. Next, this Part analyzes the Second Circuit's approach to Argentina's pari passu clause and the consequences this approach has for judicial remedies.
A. Competing Interpretations of Pari Passu
The pari passu trend in sovereign debt litigation is the most recent and potentially the most disruptive development to date. Although the erosion of sovereign immunity since 1976 and the disposal of classic state defenses during the 1980s-1990s made obtaining a judgment against a sovereign more feasible, the challenge of collection remained constant. But with rogue decisions in pari passu litigation, namely Elliott and NML, a critical pillar of unenforceability is now under stress. In these cases, courts have interpreted pari passu broadly enough to support a radical solution to sovereign unenforceability-sweeping injunctive remedies applicable to third parties.
Though the Latin phrase pari passu literally means "in equal step," which refers to equal footing among obligations, the exact meaning of the clause in sovereign debt contracts remains unclear. A version of the pari passu clause appears in most public and private international debt instruments, including syndicated loans and bonds. The securities will constitute . . . direct, unconditional, unsecured and unsubordinated obligations of the Republic and shall at all times rank pari passu without any preference among themselves. The payment obligations of the Republic under the Securities shall at all times rank at least equally with all its other present and future unsecured and unsubordinated External Indebtedness. 204 At the heart of the current pari passu controversy are two competing interpretations of the clause: a "narrow" reading versus a "broad" or "ratable payment" reading. Both sides of this debate were represented in amicus briefs filed in NML. 205 The broad reading of pari passu developed through a handful of cases brought since 2000. 206 This approach takes a broad view of the scope of the pari passu covenant by interpreting the second sentence of Argentina's clause above to prohibit prioritizing other "payment obligations" in making the payments themselves. 207 Unlike the narrow approach, the broad reading considers that prioritizing paymentsfor instance, paying exchange bondholders but not holdouts-may constitute a subordination of rank. Essentially, the broad reading extends beyond formal, legal subordination to prohibit de facto subordination as well.
Thus, the broad approach implies a requirement not only to maintain legal rank equally, but also to make payments equally-or on a pro rata basis-when a debtor is unable to pay all obligations in full. The pro rata extension is especially critical because it provides legal grounds for the injunctive relief, including court orders to third parties, seen in Elliott and 
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NML. This represents a drastic change in a sovereign's options in debt restructurings-namely the ability to prioritize payments, long considered a privilege of sovereign borrowers. 208 In effect, this interpretation prohibits a sovereign from making payments on restructured bonds without paying holdouts.
On the other hand, proponents of the narrow reading insist that the pari passu obligations involve two prongs: one internal and the other external.
209
In other words, the first sentence of pari passu addresses subordination within a bond issuance whereas the second sentence pertains to changes in rank across all indebtedness.
210
Key to the narrow interpretation is the usage of the word "rank" in the second sentence, which continues to mean "rank" rather than to "be paid." Practically speaking, the narrow reading affords scarce protection to creditors. Short of establishing a "legal basis" for discrimination among creditors-for example the Padlock Law-the narrow reading does not limit a sovereign's ability to prioritize payments.
As a result, while the narrow approach may forbid legal subordination it does not prohibit a sovereign from making differential payments among creditors. This understanding of a sovereign's ability to prioritize payments is supported by generations of prevailing practices and norms in sovereign debt. 211 The distinction between the broad ratable payment obligations and the narrow prohibition on formal subordination is vital to the question of remedies. Only a broad reading of Argentina's pari passu obligations could support the ratable payment injunctions prescribed by the court in NML.
B. The NML Approach to Pari Passu
Even if the Second Circuit's opinion does not definitively embrace the broad interpretation, the decisions certainly point in that direction. The Second Circuit distanced itself from a definitive interpretation of Argentina's pari passu clause in its most recent opinion. 212 Yet the court upheld the ratable payment injunctions, which created an awkward and uncertain gap in the opinion's reasoning. In the Second Circuit's view, Argentina's overall course of conduct-its "extraordinary behavior"-amounted to a constructive subordination of the holdout bonds. 213 More specifically, the district court found subordination in (a) Argentina's 208 See supra note 58 and accompanying text. 209 Instead of committing to an interpretation of pari passu obligations, the Second Circuit opted for ambiguity. 215 Neither the district court nor the appeals opinion clearly specified whether either action-prioritizing payments or the Padlock Law-taken on its own would constitute subordination. Under any interpretation of Argentina's pari passu clause, a formal legal subordination, such as the Padlock Law, would almost certainly amount to a violation of the clause. Accordingly, Argentina's actions could probably be considered a breach of either the broad or the narrow reading of the pari passu clause. The lack of clarity in the opinions may reflect tension between a desire to hold Argentina to account and awareness of the potentially awkward precedent.
A narrow view of pari passu in NML could have mitigated disruptive consequences and uncertainties for sovereign debt markets. Sovereigns rarely pass legislation similar to the Padlock Law. Such a holding would have also put other sovereigns on notice that this kind of legislation could breach pari passu obligations. 216 But it was perhaps the question of remedies that guided the Second Circuit away from the narrow reading of pari passu. The court's ratable payment injunctions prescribed by the court depend on a broad reading of the pari passu clause. 217 At least one prominent observer wondered if the court, exasperated with Argentina's disregard for judicial authority, might have been grasping for a way to punish the "recalcitrant" defendant. 218 The court's ratable payment injunctions forbid Argentina from making payments to exchange bondholders without paying the plaintiff holdouts. Expecting Argentina to defy its orders, the court aimed the injunctions beyond Argentina to include third parties, including financial service providers. The court's injunctions cast a shockingly wide net: orders were aimed at "all parties involved, directly or indirectly, in advising upon, preparing, processing, or facilitating any payment of the Exchange Bonds." 219 Essentially, having realized that Argentina would continue to defy judicial orders, the court decided to enforce its judgments against innocent-yet likely compliant-third parties. 220 In justifying these drastic remedies, the court found that "the equities and the public interest strongly support issuance of equitable relief" to prevent Argentina from further breach of its pari passu obligations. 221 Without means to hold an unwilling sovereign to account, the court resorted to drastic enforcement measures, which rely on an ambitious reading of Argentina's pari passu obligations. Facing limited enforcement options, the temptation of these injunctions is understandable. However, the result is a dramatic overcorrection for unenforceability-a highly complex one with significant costs. It is difficult to imagine that sovereigns like Argentina have been signing away generations of restructuring practicesessentially promising not to restructure-with just two sentences of ambiguous text. Crafting radical judicial remedies with small shreds of ambiguous language seems overzealous, given the high stakes in a critical area of law.
V. ROGUE TRENDS IN SOVEREIGN DEBT
Problems associated with rogue creditors and rogue debtors are widely known and frequently discussed. 222 Less visible, but no less important, is the problem of rogue courts or rogue precedent in sovereign debt. Market participants have long recognized this threat to orderly restructuring posed by rogue courts. 223 Cases like Elliott and NML illustrate the potential of rogue precedent to produce unpredictable results and uncertainty for sovereign debt markets. However, in recognizing NML's extraordinary and fact-driven nature, the Second Circuit provided ample grounds for other courts to distinguish NML in future cases. Therefore, until broader solutions for sovereign debt problems are implemented, other courts should apply NML as narrowly as possible.
A. The Problem of Rogue Precedent
Opposition to the NML court's interpretation of pari passu by the likes 224 For their part, the United States and the IMF have serious reservations about Argentina's approach to international obligations since the 2001 default. 225 Argentina and the IMF have also been at odds over official statistics. 226 Among other debts and unsettled disputes, Argentina owed billions to the Paris Club. 227 France, a key member of the Paris Club, overcame its concerns with Argentina's approach to international obligations in formally opposing NML. 228 Brazil and Mexico also raised concerns in separate amicus briefs filed with the Supreme Court. 229 In light of these concerns, it is remarkable that all these parties are united-in certain terms and highly visible fashion-against the NML approach to pari passu and injunctive remedies.
A primary concern among these parties is the impact of NML precedent on the orderly restructuring of sovereign debt. 230 Threats to restructuring have serious adverse consequences not just for sovereign debtors, but also for exchange creditors who participate in restructurings. 231 Granting holdouts broad rights to recover in full undermines the fair sharing of burden among sovereign creditors and the sovereign in distress. At the
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35: 49 (2014) 83 same time, this approach reduces incentives for participation in restructuring and creates serious uncertainties for financial market service providers. The Second Circuit brushed these concerns aside rather summarily, concluding that the collective action clauses (CACs) will prevent holdout situations like this in the future. 232 Unfortunately, the court's position depends on an overly optimistic view of the ability of CACs to resolve holdout issues in the future. CACs were introduced to sovereign bonds governed by New York law with Mexico's adoption of a CAC in a 2003 bond issuance. 233 CACs limit the ability of a minority of bondholders to derail a restructuring by allowing a majority-usually 75%-of bondholders to make restructuring decisions across an entire issuance. 234 Properly drafted, CACs offer a significant improvement over unanimity action clauses, especially for bonds with atomized holders. In theory, CACs alleviate coordination and collective action problems common in sovereign debt restructurings. 235 However, prevailing practices tell a different story than the Second Circuit's understanding of the CAC solution. For one, many outstanding sovereign bonds simply do not have CACs. 236 Another problem is that many CACs bind only bondholders within a particular issuance. Sovereigns often have multiple issuances. An outside investor could buy in at just over 25%-conceivably, at a relatively modest price-of just one issuance to block a restructuring. Indeed, holdout creditors recently blocked Greece's restructuring of a substantial chunk of debt in spite of CACs. 237 Aggregation clauses mitigate the cross-issuance problems to an extent, but they are not yet in wide use. 238 Contrary to the Second Circuit's understanding, contractual drafting in sovereign bonds has not yet evolved to address legal gaps in the sovereign debt system. Drastic measures like the injunctive remedies in NML offer a tempting fix for unenforceability. Courts are understandably reluctant to appear hapless when dealing with a "recalcitrant" sovereign. But injunctive remedies overcorrect for unenforceability and shift burdens to third parties. Though satisfying in some respects, the costs outweigh the benefits. Furthermore, drastic overcorrections threaten to disrupt the broader sovereign debt system, creating undesirable costs for various nonrogue actors in the market.
The dysfunctionality of the sovereign debt system is exaggerated by a small handful of high profile restructuring failures, namely Peru and Argentina. Unfortunately, it is precisely these outlier situations that have led to rogue precedent on sovereign debt, namely Elliott and NML. The vast majority of sovereign debt restructurings proceed in orderly fashion. Even though sovereign debt litigation is on the rise, few defaults trigger a wave of lawsuits.
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Between 1976 and 2013, just twenty-nine of 176 restructurings were followed by litigation.
240
And only Argentina's restructuring resulted in persistent holdout litigation. Those that do trigger waves of litigation-again, Argentina and Peru-account for the lion's share of total volumes.
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In addition to low rates of incidence, the weight of claims also remains relatively low. IMF economist Manmohan Singh once suggested that vultures might be more aptly named "mosquitos," based on their actual import. 242 Though pesky and irritating, amounts litigated are relatively small compared to the total amounts restructured. In a sample of 108 cases, the amounts litigated averaged 3.6% of total the amounts restructured with a median of just 1.7%.
243
Even the record-smashing litigation against Argentina represents just 4.5% of the original amount of Argentina's 2001 default, though this number could increase significantly as non-NML plaintiff holdouts come forward. 244 To be sure, the existing regime-or lack thereof-for sovereign debt is an imperfect system. Governing the sovereign ungovernable is a difficult task for courts. But, even as incomplete as the existing system is, it works most of the time. For all their righteous indignation about sanctity of contract and creditors rights, sovereign debt holdouts may not be as 239 See Schumacher et al., supra note 8, at 11 (Observing that "runs" on the courthouse only happened in two situations: Argentina and Peru). 240 Id. 85 victimized as they would like to appear. On average, sovereign debt haircuts are much less drastic than corporate loan and debt restructuringsdespite the vast leverage supposedly possessed by sovereigns. 245 In the United States, debtor-friendly provisions in bankruptcy law often leave unpaid creditors or pension haircuts for workers in the wake of insolvency. 246 Less sympathetic is indignation among hedge funds that buy in at heavily discounted prices to gamble for full recovery through judicial relief.
While the need for a sovereign debt insolvency mechanism is clear, potential solutions remain highly incomplete. 247 Unfortunately, a recent spasm of case law relying on strained-if not simply mistaken-readings of pari passu combined with supercharged injunctive remedies threatens further aggravation of an already imperfect system. In addition to overinflating incentives to holdout, NML also weakens incentives for participation in sovereign debt exchanges. Rogue precedent creates serious uncertainty for sovereigns, their creditors, and even third parties in the financial system such as trustees, clearing houses, and payments systems. 248 C. Applying NML Narrowly
In light of NML's outlier facts across the various stages of sovereign debt-as a debtor, as a sovereign in crisis, as a negotiating sovereign in default, and as a defendant-there are ample grounds to consider the NML precedent narrowly. NML is an unsuitable point of departure for creating highly disruptive precedent in a critical area of law for sovereign debt. Amplifying the gravity of the NML precedent, a majority of emerging market sovereign bonds issued internationally are subject to New York law and most sovereign debt litigation is brought in the Southern District of New York. 249 Further, many outstanding sovereign bonds contain pari passu clauses like Argentina's. Sovereign bonds are frequently long-term instruments with maturities measured in decades.
Unfortunately, contractual innovations like CACs lag behind contemporary problems in sovereign debt. 
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In its August 23, 2012 opinion, the Second Circuit wisely recognized the uncomfortable reality facing the court. The opinion recognized the extraordinary and fact-driven nature of NML-distancing the decision from potentially disruptive and awkward precedent:
But this case is an exceptional one with little apparent bearing on transactions that can be expected in the future. Our decision here does not control the interpretation of all pari passu clauses or the obligations of other sovereign debtors under pari passu clauses in other debt instruments. As we explicitly stated in our last opinion, we have not held that a sovereign debtor breaches its pari passu clause every time it pays one creditor and not another, or even every time it enacts a law disparately affecting a creditor's rights. We simply affirm the district court's conclusion that Argentina's extraordinary behavior was a violation of the particular pari passu clause found in the FAA.
251
In recognizing the extraordinary nature of NML, the Second Circuit provided grounds to apply the NML precedent narrowly. Other courts should consider this message from the Second Circuit as a starting point for distinguishing NML from future sovereign debt cases. Though a holding based on a decisive interpretation of pari passu would have supplied more clarity, the Second Circuit's language at least provides grounds for mitigating the NML precedent until more permanent solutions for sovereign insolvency emerge.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Although the Second Circuit partially recognized the "exceptional" circumstances of this case, the NML situation is exceptional across all phases of sovereign debt. Faced with bad facts, NML has already created bad law. But other courts can mitigate the fallout by distinguishing this case from others until broader sovereign debt solutions are available. There are ample and compelling grounds to apply NML narrowly. Cases like Elliott and NML underscore the dangerous temptation facing courts to overcorrect for unenforceability in sovereign debt litigation. Until contractual innovations or institutional solutions catch up with the rogue trends in sovereign debt, it is likely these temptations will persist. 
